فهرست مطالب
Contents\nAcknowledgements\nPreface\n1 Introduction\n 1.1 Controversy Over Kant’s Moral Theory\n 1.2 Three of Kant’s Causal Concepts\n 1.3 Single-Object and Dual-Object Ontology\n 1.4 Actions and Events\n 1.5 Summary of the Scope and Limits of the Book\n2 Causal Theories of Objects and Grice’s Causal Theory of Perception\n 2.1 Introduction\n 2.2 Grice’s Basic Idea\n 2.3 A Consequence of Grice’s Theory\n 2.4 A Contrast Between Causation in Perception and Ordinary Causation Based on This Consequence of Grice’s Theory, i. e. the Imperceptibility of the Agent\n 2.5 A Second Consequence of Grice’s Theory\n 2.6 Applications of the Second Consequence of Grice’s Theory\n 2.7 The Logical Connection Between the Two Consequences of Grice’s Theory As Applied to All the Examples\n 2.8 Explanation of the Connection between the Two Consequences\n 2.9 The Two Consequences of Grice’s Theory, the Single-object/Dual- Aspect Ontology Involved in the Theory, and Time\n 2.10 An Objection to 2.9. and a Reply\n3 Kant’s Theory of Practical Causality\n 3.1 Transition from Grice to Kant\n 3.2 Application of Kant’s Causal Theory of Action: Kant’s Incompatibilism\n 3.3 Application of Kant’s Non-causal Theory of Action: His Compatibilism\n 3.4 The Three Alternative Views and the Texts\n 3.5 Recent Views About Kant on Rational Agency\n 3.6 Rejection of Recent Views\n 3.7 Grice’s and Kant’s Causal Theories and Time\n4 Conscience: Remembering One’s Forbidden Actions\n 4.1 Another Way to Derive the Timelessness of the Causality of the Freedom of the Will\n 4.2 Analysis of the Epigram\n5 The New Problem of the Imputability of Actions\n 5.1 The New Problem of the Imputability of Actions\n 5.2 The Moral Law is the Practical Causal Law\n 5.3 Solutions to the Old Imputability Problem\n 5.4 The Solution to the New Imputability Problem\n 5.5 Laws of Freedom and Laws of Nature and the Solution to the New Problem of Imputability\n 5.6 Hud Hudson’s Front-loading\n 5.7 The Problem of the Imputability of Actions as a Fundamental Mistake\n 5.8 Korsgaard’s and My Respective Corrections of the Mistake\n 5.9 Conclusion\n6 Maxims and Categorical Imperatives\n 6.1 The Possibility of Particular Categorical Imperatives\n 6.1.1 Two Apparent Problems with the Conclusion of the Last Chapter\n 6.1.2 Maxims can be Categorical Imperatives\n 6.2 Maxims, Categorical Imperatives, and a Presumed Omission in Kant’s Derivation of the First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative\n 6.2.1 A Presumed Omission in Kant’s Derivation of the Universalizability Formula of the Categorical Imperative\n 6.2.2 Hegel and the Traditional Criticism of the Derivation\n 6.2.3 The Validity of the Derivation\n 6.2.4 The Origin of the Illusion\n 6.2.5 Wood’s Rational Egoist Objection\n 6.2.6 Conclusion\n7 Necessity and Practical A Priori Knowledge: Kant and Kripke\n 7.1 The A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth of Categorical Imperatives\n 7.2 Kripke’s Complaint About Kant\n 7.3 The Target Statement of Kripke’s Complaint about Kant\n 7.4 Kant’s Shift from Theoretical to Practical Knowledge\n 7.5 The Unsuitability of Happiness as a Universal Principle of Action\n 7.6 The Unsuitability of a Precept as a Practical Law (praktische Gesetz)\n 7.7 Subjective Necessity as Both Practical Contingency and Natural Necessity\n 7.8 Practical Laws and Precepts\n 7.9 Kant’s Practical Causal Laws as Kripke’s Necessities\n8 The Bounds of Freedom\n 8.1 Making Objects Actual\n 8.2 The Non-legislative Form of a Maxim Creates a Certain Problem for Our Interpretation of Kant’s Moral Law\n 8.3 Action without Passion and Independent of Nature\n 8.4 The Center of the Circle of Maxims\n 8.5 The Last Word: The Incentive to be Moral\nReferences\nSubject index
